LITERATUUR



Bewustzijnsfilosofie.



@

Abbott, B.

(1995):
Natural language and thought: Thinking in English.
In: ' Behavior and Philosophy ', vol. 23, pp. 49-55.

@

Abbott, B.

(2000):
Fodor and Lepore on meaning similarity and compositionality.
In: ' Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 97, pp. 454-6.

@

Abelson, R.

(1970):
A refutation of mind-body identity.
In: ' Philosophical Studies ', vol. 18, pp. 85-90.

@

Ackermann, D. F.

(1983):
Wittgenstein, rules and origin--privacy.
In: ' Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research ', vol. 1, pp. 63-69.

@

Adam, A.

(2003):
Cyborgs in the Chinese room: Boundaries transgressed and boundaries blurred.
In: J. Preston; M. Bishop (Ed.): 'Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence '.
Oxford University Press.

@

Adams, F.

(1979):
Properties, functionalism, and the identity theory.
In: ' Eidos ', vol. 1, pp. 153-79.

@

Adams, F.

(1991):
Causal contents.
In: B. McLaughlin (Ed.): 'Dretske and his Critics '.
Blackwell.

@

Adams, F.

(1993):
Fodor's modal argument.
In: ' Philosophical Psychology ', vol. 6, pp. 41-56.

@

Adams, F.

(2001):
Empathy, neural imaging and the theory versus simulation debate.
In: ' Mind & Language ', vol. 16, pp. 368-392.

@

Adams, F.

(2002):
Mental representation.
In: S. Stich; T. Warfield (Ed.): 'Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind '.
Blackwell.

@

Adams, F.

(2003):
The informational turn in philosophy.
In: ' Minds and Machines ', vol. 13, pp. 471-501.

@

Adams, F.; Aizawa, K.

(1992):
`X' means X: Semantics Fodor-style.
In: ' Minds and Machines ', vol. 2, pp. 175-83.

@

Adams, F.; Aizawa, K.

(1993):
Fodorian semantics, pathologies, and "Block's problem".
In: ' Minds and Machines ', vol. 3, pp. 97-104.

@

Adams, F.; Aizawa, K.

(1994):
`X' means X: Fodor/Warfield semantics.
In: ' Minds and Machines ', vol. 4, pp. 215-31.

@

Adams, F.; Aizawa, K.

(1997):
Fodor's asymmetric causal dependency theory and proximal projections.
In: ' Southern Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 35, pp. 433-437.

@

Adams, F.; Aizawa, K.

(1997):
Rock beats scissors: Historicalism fights back.
In: ' Analysis ', vol. 57, pp. 273-81.

@

Adams, F.; Aizawa, K.

(2001):
The bounds of cognition.
In: ' Philosophical Psychology ', vol. 14, pp. 43-64.

@

Adams, F.; Aizawa, K.; Fuller, G.

(1992):
Rules in programming languages and networks.
In: J. Dinsmore (Ed.): 'The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap '.
Lawrence Erlbaum.

@

Adams, F.; Drebushenko, D.; Fuller, G.; Stecker, R.

(1990):
Narrow content: Fodor's folly.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 5, pp. 213-29.

@

Adams, F.; Fuller, G.

(1992):
Names, contents, and causes.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 7, pp. 205-21.

@

Adams, W.

(2004):
Machine consciousness: Plausible idea or semantic distortion?.
In: ' Journal of Consciousness Studies ', vol. 11, no. 9, pp. 46-56.

@

Addis, L.

(1995):
The ontology of emotion.
In: ' Southern Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 33, pp. 261-78.

@

Addis, L.

(2000):
The simplicity of content.
In: ' Metaphysica ', vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 23-44.

@

Adler, J.

(2002):
Belief's Own Ethics.
MIT Press.

@

Adolphs, R.

(2004):
'Edison' & 'Russell': Definitions versus inventions in the analysis of emotion.
In: J. Fellous (Ed.): 'Who Needs Emotions '.
Oxford University Press.

@

Adshead, G.

(1999):
Psychopaths and other-regarding beliefs.
In: ' Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology ', vol. 99, pp. 41-44.

@

Agar, N.

(1993):
What do frogs really believe?.
In: ' Australasian Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 71, pp. 1-12.

@

Agar, N.

(2003):
Functionalism and personal identity.
In: ' Nous ', vol. 37, pp. 52-70.

@

Agre, P.

(1995):
Computation and embodied agency.
In: ' Informatica ', vol. 19, pp. 527-35.

@

Agre, P.

(2002):
The practical logic of computer work.
In: M. Scheutz (Ed.): 'Computationalism: New Directions '.
MIT Press.

@

Aizawa, K.

(1994):
Lloyd's dialectical theory of representation.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 9, pp. 1-24.

@

Aizawa, K.

(1994):
Representations without rules, connectionism, and the syntactic argument.
In: ' Synthese ', vol. 101, pp. 465-92.

@

Aizawa, K.

(1997):
Explaining systematicity.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 12, pp. 115-36.

@

Aizawa, K.

(1997):
The role of the systematicity argument in classicism and connectionism.
In: S. O'Nuallain (Ed.): 'Two Sciences of Mind '.
John Benjamins.

@

Aizawa, K.

(1997):
Exhibiting verses explaining systematicity: A reply to Hadley and Hayward.
In: ' Minds and Machines ', vol. 7, pp. 39-55.

@

Aizawa, K.

(2002):
Cognitive architecture.
In: S. Stich; T. Warfield (Ed.): 'Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind '.
Blackwell.

@

Alanen, L.

(2003):
What are emotions about?.
In: ' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ', vol. 67, pp. 311-354.

@

Albritton, R.

(1985):
Freedom of the will and freedom of action.
In: ' Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association ', vol. 59, pp. 239-51.

@

Aldridge, V. C.

(1987):
Kripke on Wittgenstein on Regulation.
In: ' Philosophy ', vol. 62, pp. 375-384.

@

Aleksander, I.

(2003):
Neural depictions of "world" and "self": Bringing computational understanding into the Chinese room.
In: J. Preston; M. Bishop (Ed.): 'Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence '.
Oxford University Press.

@

Aleksander, I.; Dunmall, B.

(2003):
Axioms and tests for the presence of minimal consciousness in agents I: Preamble.
In: ' Journal of Consciousness Studies ', vol. 10.

@

Alexander, P.

(1959):
Other people's experiences.
In: ' 1959 '.

@

Alexander, S.

(1920):
Space, Time, and Deity.
Macmillan.

@

Allen, A. H. B.

(1952):
Other minds.
In: ' Mind ', vol. 61, pp. 328-348.

@

Allen, B.

(1989):
Gruesome arithmetic: Kripke's sceptic replies.
In: ' Dialogue ', vol. 28, pp. 257-264.

@

Allen, C.

(1992):
Mental content.
In: ' British Journal for the Philosophy of Science ', vol. 43, pp. 537-53.

@

Allen, C.

(1995):
It isn't what you think: A new idea about intentional causation.
In: ' Nous ', vol. 29, pp. 115-26.

@

Allen, C.

(1997):
Animal cognition and animal minds.
In: M. Carrier; P. Machamer (Ed.): 'Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind '.
Pittsburgh University Press.

@

Allen, C.

(1999):
Animal concepts revisited: the use of self-monitoring as an empirical approach.
In: ' Erkenntnis ', vol. 51, pp. 537-544.

@

Allen, C.

(2004):
Is anyone a cognitive ethologist?.
In: ' Biology and Philosophy ', vol. 19, pp. 589-607.

@

Allen, C.; Bekoff, M.

(1992):
On aims and methods of cognitive ethology.
In: ' Philosophy of Science Association ', vol. 1992.

@

Allen, C.; Bekoff, M.

(1995):
Cognitive ethology and the intentionality of animal behavior.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 10, pp. 313-328.

@

Allen, C.; Bekoff, M.

(1997):
Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology.
MIT Press.

@

Allen, C.; Hauser, M.

(1991):
Concept attribution in nonhuman animals: Theoretical and methodological problems in ascribing complex mental processes .
In: ' Philosophy of Science ', vol. 58, pp. 221-40.

@

Almeida, M.; Bernstein, M.

(2003):
Lucky libertarianism.
In: ' Philosophical Studies ', vol. 22, pp. 93-119.

@

Almog, J.

(2001):
What Am I?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem.
Oxford University Press.

@

Alper, G.

(1990):
A psychoanalyst takes the Turing test.
In: ' Psychoanalytic Review ', vol. 77, pp. 59-68.

@

Alston, W. P.

(1971):
Varieties of priveleged access.
In: ' American Philosophical Quarterly ', vol. 8, pp. 223-41.

@

Alston, W. P.

(1983):
What's wrong with immediate knowledge?.
In: ' Synthese ', vol. 55, pp. 73-96.

@

Alter, T.; Rachels, S.

(2002):
Epistemicism and the combined spectrum.
In: ' Ratio ', vol. 17, pp. 241-55.

@

Ameriks, K.

(1973):
Plantinga and other minds.
In: ' Southern Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 16, pp. 285-91.

@

Anderson, D.

(1987):
Is the Chinese room the real thing?.
In: ' Philosophy ', vol. 62, pp. 389-93.

@

Anderson, J. R.

(1978):
Arguments concerning representations for mental imagery.
In: ' Psychological Review ', vol. 85.

@

Andler, D.

(1995):
Can we knock off the shackles of syntax?.
In: E. Villanueva (Ed.): 'Content '.
Ridgeview.

@

Andrews, K.

(2002):
Knowing mental states: The asymmetry of psychological prediction and explanation.
In: Q. Smith; A. Jokic (Ed.): 'Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives '.
Oxford University Press.

@

Angel, L.

(1989):
How to Build a Conscious Machine.
Westview Press.

@

Angel, L.

(1994):
Am I a computer?.
In: E. Dietrich (Ed.): 'Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons '.
Academic Press.

@

Anscombe, G. E. M.

(1971):
Causality and Determinism.
Cambridge University Press.

@

Anscombe, G. E. M.

(1976):
`Soft' determinism.
In: G. Ryle (Ed.): 'Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy '.
Oriel Press.

@

Anscombe, G. E. M.

(1985):
Review of Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
In: ' Ethics ', vol. 95, pp. 342-352.

@

Anscombe, G. E. M.

(1985):
Critical Notice: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
In: ' Canadian Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 15, pp. 103-9.

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Antony, L.

(1989):
Semantic anorexia: On the notion of content in cognitive science.
In: G. Boolos (Ed.): 'Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam '.
Cambridge University Press.

@

Antony, L.

(1989):
Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force.
In: ' Philosophical Review ', vol. 98, pp. 153-87.

@

Antony, L.

(1991):
The causal relevance of the mental.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 6, pp. 295-327.

@

Antony, L.

(1995):
Law and order in psychology.
In: ' Philosophical Perspectives ', vol. 9, pp. 429-46.

@

Antony, L.

(1997):
Feeling fine about the mind.
In: ' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ', vol. 57, pp. 381-87.

@

Antony, L.

(1999):
Making room for the mental.
In: ' Philosophical Studies ', vol. 95, pp. 37-44.

@

Antony, L.

(2001):
Brain states with attitude.
In: A. Meijers (Ed.): 'Explaining Beliefs '.
CSLI.

@

Antony, L.

(2001):
Empty heads?.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 16, pp. 193-214.

@

Antony, L. M.

(1999):
Multiple realizability, projectibility, and the reality of mental properties.
In: ' Philosophical Topics ', vol. 26, pp. 1-24.

@

Antony, L. M.

(2003):
Who's afraid of disjunctive properties?.
In: ' Philosophical Issues ', vol. 13, pp. 1-21.

@

Antony, L. M.; Levine, J.

(1997):
Reduction with autonomy.
In: ' Philosophical Perspectives ', vol. 11, pp. 83-105.

@

Antony, L.; Levine, J.

(1991):
The nomic and the robust.
In: B. Loewer; G. Rey (Ed.): 'Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics '.
Blackwell.

@

Antony, M. V.

(1991):
Fodor and Pylyshyn on connectionism.
In: ' Minds and Machines ', vol. 1, pp. 321-41.

@

Antony, M. V.

(1993):
Social relations and the individuation of thought.
In: ' Mind ', vol. 102, pp. 247-61.

@

Antony, M. V.

(2003):
Davidson's argument for monism.
In: ' Synthese ', vol. 135, pp. 1-12.

@

Appelbaum, I.

(1998):
Fodor, modularity, and speech perception.
In: ' Philosophical Psychology ', vol. 11, pp. 317-330.

@

Apter, A.

(1991):
The problem of who: Multiple personality, personal identity, and the double brain.
In: ' Philosophical Psychology ', vol. 4, pp. 219-48.

@

Arbib, M.

(1989):
Modularity, schemas and neurons: A critique of Fodor.
In: P. Slezak (Ed.): 'Computers, Brains and Minds '.
Kluwer.

@

Arbib, M.

(2004):
Beware the passionate robot.
In: J. Fellous (Ed.): 'Who Needs Emotions '.
Oxford University Press.

@

Arcaya, J. M.

(1989):
Memory and temporality: A phenomenological alternative.
In: ' Philosophical Psychology ', vol. 2, pp. 101-110.

@

Ariew, A.

(1996):
Innateness and canalization.
In: ' Philosophy of Science Supplement ', vol. 63, pp. 19-27.

@

Ariew, A.

(2002):
Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology.
Oxford University Press.

@

Ariew, A.

(2003):
Natural selection doesn't work that way: Jerry Fodor vs. evolutionary psychology on gradualism and saltationism.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 18, pp. 478-483.

@

Arjo, D.

(1996):
Sticking up for Oedipus: Fodor on intentional generalizations and broad content.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 11, pp. 231-45.

@

Arkway, A.

(2000):
The simulation theory, the theory theory and folk psychological explanation.
In: ' Philosophical Studies ', vol. 98, pp. 115-137.

@

Arlo Costa, H.; Collins, J.; Levi, I.

(1995):
Desire-as-belief implies opinionation or indifference.
In: ' Analysis ', vol. 55, pp. 2-5.

@

Armstrong, B.

(1984):
Wittgenstein on private languages: It takes two to talk.
In: ' Philosophical Investigations ', vol. 7.

@

Armstrong, D.

(1999):
The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction.
Westview Press.

@

Armstrong, D. M.

(1968):
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.
Routledge and Kegan Paul.

@

Armstrong, D. M.

(1968):
The headless woman and the defense of materialism.
In: ' Analysis ', vol. 29, pp. 48-49.

@

Armstrong, D. M.

(1969):
Colour realism and the argument from microscopes.
In: R. Brown; C. Rollins (Ed.): 'Contemporary Philosophy in Australia '.
Humanities Press.

@

Armstrong, D. M.

(1970):
The nature of mind.
In: C. Borst (Ed.): 'The Mind/Brain Identity Theory '.
Macmillan.

@

Armstrong, D. M.

(1973):
Epistemological foundations for a materialist theory of mind.
In: ' Philosophy of Science ', vol. 40, pp. 178-93.

@

Armstrong, D. M.

(1982):
Metaphysics and supervenience.
In: ' Critica ', vol. 42, pp. 3-17.

@

Armstrong, D. M.; Malcolm, N.

(1984):
Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind.
Blackwell.

@

Arregui, J. V.

(1996):
On the intentionality of moods: Phenomenology and linguistic analysis.
In: ' American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly ', vol. 70, pp. 397-411.

@

Arrington, R.

(1999):
Machines, consciousness, and thought.
In: ' Idealistic Studies ', vol. 29, pp. 231-243.

@

Arstila, V.

(2003):
True colors, false theories.
In: ' Australian Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 81, pp. 41-61.

@

Atherton, M.; Schwarz, R.

(1974):
Linguistic innateness and its evidence.
In: ' Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 71.

@

Atkin A.

(1992):
On consciousness: What is the role of emergence?.
In: ' Medical Hypotheses ', vol. 38, pp. 311-14.

@

Atkinson, A. P.; Wheeler, M.

(2003):
Evolutionary psychology's grain problem and the cognitive neuroscience of reasoning.
In: D. Over (Ed.): 'Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate '.
Psychology Press.

@

Atkinson, A. P.; Wheeler, M.

(2004):
The grain of domains: The evolutionary-psychological case against domain-general cognition.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 19, pp. 147-76.

@

Atkinson, A.; Wheeler, M.

(2004):
The grain of domains: The evolutionary-psychological case against domain-general cognition.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 19, pp. 147-176.

@

Atran, S.

(2005):
Adaptationism for human cognition: Strong, spurious, or weak?.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 20, pp. 39-67.

@

Audi, R.

(1974):
Moral responsibility, freedom, and compulsion.
In: ' American Philosophical Quarterly ', vol. 11, pp. 1-14.

@

Audi, R.

(1978):
The ontological status of mental images.
In: ' Inquiry ', vol. 21, pp. 348-61.

@

Audi, R.

(1993):
Mental causation: Sustaining and dynamic.
In: J. Heil; A. Mele (Ed.): 'Mental Causation '.
Oxford University Press.

@

Audi, R.

(1994):
Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe.
In: ' Nous ', vol. 28, pp. 419-34.

@

Aune, B.

(1961):
The problem of other minds.
In: ' 1961 '.

@

Aune, B.

(1966):
Feigl on the mind-body problem.
In: P. Feyerabend; G. Maxwell (Ed.): 'Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl '.
University of Minnesota Press.

@

Aune, B.

(1970):
Free will, 'can', and ethics: A reply to Lehrer.
In: ' Analysis ', vol. 30, pp. 77-83.

@

Aune, B.

(1986):
Other minds after twenty years.
In: ' 1986 '.

@

Aune, B.

(1994):
Speaking of selves.
In: ' Philosophical Quarterly ', vol. 44, pp. 279-93.

@

Austin, J.

(1946):
Other minds.
In: ' Aristotelian Society Supplement ', vol. 20, pp. 148-87.

@

Austin, J. W.

(1975):
Rorty's materialism.
In: ' Auslegung ', vol. 3, pp. 20-28.

@

Averill, E. W.

(1985):
Color and the anthropocentric problem.
In: ' Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 82, pp. 281-303.

@

Averill, E. W.

(1992):
The relational nature of color.
In: ' Philosophical Review ', vol. 101, pp. 551-88.

@

Averill, E. W.; Keating, B.

(1981):
Does interactionism violate a law of classical physics?.
In: ' Mind ', vol. 90, pp. 102-7.

@

Avison, M. J.

(2002):
Functional brain mapping: What is it good for? Absolutely nothing.
In: ' Brain and Mind ', vol. 3, pp. 367-73.

@

Avramides, A.

(2001):
Other Minds.
Routledge.

@

Aydede, M.

(1997):
Has Fodor really changed his mind on narrow content?.
In: ' Mind and Language ', vol. 12, pp. 422-58.

@

Aydede, M.

(1997):
Language of thought: The connectionist contribution.
In: ' Minds and Machines ', vol. 7, pp. 57-101.

@

Aydede, M.

(2000):
On the type/token relation of mental representations.
In: ' Facta Philosophica ', vol. 2, pp. 23-50.

@

Aydede, M.

(2000):
An analysis of pleasure vis-a-vis pain.
In: ' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ', vol. 61, pp. 537-570.

@

Aydede, M.

(2001):
Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about pain.
In: ' Consciousness and Emotion ', vol. 2, pp. 29-73.

@

Aydede, M.

(2005):
Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study.
MIT Press.

@

Aydede, M.

(2005):
A critical and quasi-historical essay on theories of pain.
In: M. Aydede (Ed.): 'Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study '.
MIT Press.

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Aydede, M.; Guzeldere, G.

(2002):
Some foundational problems in the scientific study of pain.
In: ' Philosophy of Science Supplement ', vol. 69, pp. 265-83.

@

Aydede, M.; Robbins, P.

(2001):
Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations?.
In: ' Canadian Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 31, pp. 1-22.

@

Ayer, A.

(1960):
Professor Malcolm on dreams.
In: ' 1960 '.

@

Ayer, A. J.

(1953):
One's knowledge of other minds.
In: ' 1953 '.

@

Ayer, A. J.

(1954):
Can there be a private language?.
In: ' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement ', vol. 27.

@

Ayer, A. J.

(1954):
Freedom and necessity.
In: ' Philosophical Essays '.

@

Ayer, A. J.

(1956):
The Problem of Knowledge.
Harmondsworth.

@

Ayer, A. J.

(1980):
Free will and rationality.
In: Z. van Straaten (Ed.): 'Philosophical Subjects '.
Oxford University Press.

@

Ayers, M.

(1968):
The Refutation of Determinism.
Methuen.

@

Bacon, J.

(1986):
Supervenience, necessary coextensions, and reducibility.
In: ' Philosophical Studies ', vol. 49, pp. 163-76.

@

Bacon, J.

(1995):
Weak supervenience supervenes.
In: E. Savellos; U. Yalcin (Ed.): 'Supervenience: New Essays '.
Cambridge University Press.

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Badcock, C.

(2004):
Emotion verses reason as a genetic conflict.
In: D. Evans; P. Cruse (Ed.): 'Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality '.
Oxford University Press.

@

Baier, A.

(1976):
Mixing memory and desire.
In: ' American Philosophical Quarterly ', vol. 13, pp. 213-20.

@

Baier, A.

(1990):
What emotions are about.
In: ' Philosophical Perspectives ', vol. 4, pp. 1-29.

@

Baier, A.

(2004):
Feelings that matter.
In: R. Solomon (Ed.): 'Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions '.
Oxford University Press.

@

Baier, K.

(1962):
Smart on sensations.
In: ' Australasian Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 40, pp. 57-68.

@

Bailey, A.

(1998):
Supervenience and physicalism.
In: ' Synthese ', vol. 117, pp. 53-73.

@

Baillie, J.

(1991):
Split brains and single minds.
In: ' Journal of Philosophical Research ', vol. 16, pp. 11-18.

@

Baillie, J.

(1993):
Recent work on personal identity.
In: ' Philosophical Books ', vol. 34, pp. 193-206.

@

Baillie, J.

(1993):
What matters in survival.
In: ' Southern Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 31, pp. 255-61.

@

Baillie, J.

(1996):
Identity, relation R, and what matters: A challenge to Derek Parfit.
In: ' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly ', vol. 77, pp. 263-267.

@

Baillie, J.

(1997):
Personal identity and mental content.
In: ' Philosophical Psychology ', vol. 10, pp. 323-33.

@

Bain, D.

(2003):
Intentionalism and pain.
In: ' Philosophical Quarterly ', vol. 53, pp. 502-523.

@

Baker, G. P.; Hacker, P. M. S.

(1984):
Scepticism, Rules and Language.
Blackwell.

@

Baker, G. P.; Hacker, P. M. S.

(1985):
Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity.

@

Baker, G.; Hacker, P.

(1984):
Critical study: On misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's private language argument.
In: ' Synthese ', vol. 58.

@

Baker, G.; Hacker, P.

(1986):
Reply to Mr. Mounce.
In: ' Philosophical Investigations ', vol. 9, pp. 199-204.

@

Baker, G.; and Hacker, P.

(1990):
Malcolm on language and rules.
In: ' Philosophy ', vol. 65, pp. 167-179.

@

Baker, L. R.

(1985):
A farewell to functionalism.
In: ' Philosophical Studies ', vol. 48, pp. 1-14.

@

Baker, L. R.

(1985):
Just what do we have in mind?.
In: ' Midwest Studies in Philosophy ', vol. 10, pp. 25-48.

@

Baker, L. R.

(1986):
Content by courtesy.
In: ' Journal of Philosophy ', vol. 84, pp. 197-213.

@

Baker, L. R.

(1987):
Instrumentalism: Back from the brink?.
In: ' Saving Belief '.

@

Baker, L. R.

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